1
اقتصاد::
نرخ وجوه فدرال، نرخ وجوه فدرال
Interest on reserves Federal funds rate Bank credit Monetary policy
In October 2008, the Federal Reserve shifted from a federal-funds-rate target and zero interest on bank reserves to a regime with an identical interest rate on required and excess reserves, set above its targeted federal funds rate.
The Fed's regime shift to banks holding positive excess reserves and minimal in- terbank lending strengthens the effect on bank credit of its current primary policy instrument, the interest rate on excess reserves, relative to the effect of its previous primary instrument, the federal funds rate.
For instance, we show that among the numerous optimal IOER-IORR combinations are combinations in which the Fed returns to a regime in which its key instrument is the federal funds rate instead of an identical interest rate paid on both required and excess reserve balances.
This model allows us to conduct formal evaluation of monetary policy implications with regard to the shift from the Fed's pre-October 2008 regime with a federal-funds-rate target and no interest on reserves to the post-October 2008 regime with the IOER equal to the IORR and set at a level above the prevailing federal funds rate (see, for instance, Ihrig et al.،A significant increase in volatility in the federal funds rate would be of concern because it would affect other overnight rates, raising funding risks for most large banks, securities dealers, and other money market participants.
As a result, even when the Fed's stated strategy during 1979-82 was to target a reserve aggregate such as non-borrowed reserves, in order to keep volatility in the federal funds rate from becoming excessive - which was highly likely given that reserve balances earned no interest while there were also significant 'frown costs' historically associated with borrowing from the Fed - the actual tactic employed ensured that the federal funds rate remained within an acceptable range, as confirmed by Meulendyke (1988).
Not surprisingly, federal funds rate volatility increased dramatically.
However, the increased volatility in the federal funds rate was possible only as a result of the sizeable spread between the penalty rate of interest charged on borrowing from the Fed and the interest rate paid on reserve balances (zero per cent).
Though the Fed set the discount rate below the target federal funds rate prior to 2003, the non-monetary costs associated with borrowing from the discount window combined with the substantial penalty historically assessed on overnight overdrafts (the day's federal funds rate plus 400 basis points) meant that the federal funds rate could rise substantially if reserve balances provided were insufficient to accommodate the existing demand.
واژگان شبکه مترجمین ایران